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Judicial Discipline: A Legislative
Perspective
By

ROBERT

W

KASTENMEIER* AND

ICHAEL

J

REMINGTON**

In 1980 the Congress adopted public law 96-458, the Judicial
Tenure and Disability Act. This act has been largely ignored
by the Federaljudiciary'
In the long run, Mr President, it seems to me that some hard
questions should be posed as to whether impeachment by the
2
Congress is appropriatefor Federaljudges.
I believe that the citizens of our country will agree that those
who have been convicted of felonies should not occupy positions of trust and responsibility in our Government.'
Ifeel that the currentprocedurefor impeachingFederaljudges
4
is unworkable.
INTRODUCTION

These statements, made by Senators in anticipation of or in
response to the removal of Judge Harry T Claiborne from
office, signal a clear congressional concern about the health of

* Member of Congress; Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adnnimstration of Justice. LL.B.,
Umversity of Wisconsin, 1952. The authors wish to thank Steven B. Burbank, Professor
of Law, Umversity of Pennsylvania, and Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress, for their constructive comments. Any mistakes, misstatements, or omssions are the authors' own.
** Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration
of Justice.
1 132 CONG. REc. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
2 Id.
at 516,789 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Dole).
3 Id. at S7867 (daily ed. June 18, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
4 133 CoNG. Rac. 4990 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1987) (statement of Sen. Heflin); see
Heflin, The Impeachment Process:Modernizing an Archaic System, 71 JUDICATURE 123
(1987) ("1 have concluded that our current impeachment rules were written for an era
that has passed and a Congress that has changed.").
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judicial discipline law, both that rooted in constitutional text
and that contained in the statute books. 5 The impeachment
conviction of a sitting federal judge in 1986, the first in almost
fifty years, rightfully magmfied attention on the general subject
of judicial discipline,
Impeachment proceedings bring heavy political armaments
into action and only occur rarely Since the drafting of the
Umted States Constitution two centuries ago, the House of
Representatives has conducted only fifteen impeachments. 6 Following on the heels of these impeachments, the Senate has
conducted twelve impeachment trials. Only five have resulted in
convictions and removals from office. 7 The impeachment of a
federal judge is the jagged tip of an iceberg; under the water
and out of sight lies the larger mass of judicial discipline and
ethics.
In 1987, the Constitutional Bicentennial year, we rightfully
celebrated the written document that serves as the charter of our
government, noting the resiliency and flexibility of the text. We
not only feted the past, but looked to the future. We applauded
what was right about the Constitution and not what was wrong.
The Claiborne impeachment and the Bicentenmal, considered
together, bring into focus both the resiliency and the fragility of
our government charter. They lead us not into complacency, but
to search for answers about what makes our system work. Our
mission should be to reassess and not to react. If we are serious
about preserving our democratic system of government, we should
ask some tough questions. We should not ignore defects in the
constitutional text in light of present day problems. Nowhere

The Chairman of the House Managers in the Claiborne impeachment feels that
the system worked well. Chairman Peter W Rodino, Jr., observed: "the proceeding
reaffirmed both the delicacy and durability-as well as the wisdom-of existing constitutional procedures." Rodino, The Compact with the People, 27 SANTA CLARA L. Rav.
471, 480 (1987).
6 Two civil officers-Judge Mark Delahay and President Richard Nixon-resigned
from office before the full House adopted articles of impeachment but after proceedings
had started. Of the 15, 11 have been federal judges.
In this Article, "impeachment" is used in the broadest sense to include the House
power to engage in an impeachment inquiry and not merely the Senate trial and potential
removal from office power.

7 See STAFF OF HousE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., IST SaSS.,
TUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 17 n.84 (1974).

CONSTI-
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are the questions more difficult than in the area of separation
of powers and the accountability of high-ranking public officials.
The debate about judicial discipline and ethics is not exactly
a new one. Nor are proposals for legislative change and constitutional amendments. The very first Congress provided that a
judge convicted of accepting a bribe "shall forever be disqualified to hold any office of honour, trust or profit under the
United States. ' 8 Heated debate arose in Congress during the
impeachment proceedings of federal Judge John Pickenng in
1803. The first constitutional amendment to establish a removal
mechamsm as an alternative to impeachment was introduced in
1791, and between 1807 and 1812 nine more constitutional
amendments were proposed as a result of the impeachment and
attempted removal of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. 9 In
reaction to the last impeachment and removal from office of a
federal judge (Judge Halsted Ritter) prior to the impeachment
and conviction of Judge Claiborne, a number of constitutional
amendments and statutory changes were proposed. 10 Significant
among these were the bills introduced by the Chairman of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, Hatton Summers." Proposals to amend the Constitution have been short-lived, but they
should be taken seriously as political barometers. Today, in the
wake of the Claiborne proceedings, amendments and cries for
congressional vigilance are again on the rise. 12 Proposals for
change key into a loss of public confidence about the trustworthiness of all public officials, with that confidence thought to
have eroded badly in the recent past.' 3

' Section 21 of the Act for the Punishment of certain Cnmes against the United
States of April 30, 1790.

9 See The Judicial Tenure Act: Hearings on S. 1423 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 32 (1977).
10See AmmitRcAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND TENuRE PRoPosALs (1979), reprinted in Judicial Tenure and Discipline 1979-80: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House

Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 507, 511-12 (1980) [hereinafter 1979-80
House Hearings].
1, Id. at 512; see, e.g., 81 CONG. REc. 6164 (1937).
12

See S.J. Res. 113, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Heflin); H.R.J. Res. 364, 100th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Klescka).
" As was aptly observed by one of the sponsors of judicial discipline legislation
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During the post-Watergate era, Congress enacted a variety
of statutory schemes to promote high ethical standards by public
servants. That the national interest requires the very best judges
has always been true but never more so than today To ensure
the delivery of quality justice, judges are subject to canons of
judicial ethics, financial disclosure requirements, judicial disqualification standards, and a judicial discipline statute. 14 Members of Congress and high ranking executive branch officials are
similarly treated.
In 1980, Congress enacted judicial discipline legislation by
building on the pre-existing structure of the judicial councils of
the circuits and the Judicial Conference of the United States,
and by creating a mechanism and procedures within the judicial
branch to consider and respond to complaints against federal
judges. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 198015 (1980 Act), in considerable detail, restructured the councils to include district judge representation
and set forth the process to be followed in resolving complaints
against judges. The Act contemplated that most complaints would
be dismissed or resolved at a regional level, but that the most
important would be processed to the Judicial Conference and
perhaps ultimately to the Congress. The Act was the result of
several years of cooperation and good communications among
16
the three branches of government.

dunng Senate floor debate,
We all must recognize the unfortunate fact that public confidence in
Government has been eroded over the past few years for many reasons,
and it will continue to decline unless affirmative steps are taken, in each
branch of Government, to stimulate renewed trust in public officials and

institutions.
124 CONG. REc. S14,748 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1978) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
'4 See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972); 28 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., 455;
and 372(c).
11Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980). The Act's circuit council reform is
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332, and the Act's disciplinary procedures are codified at 28
U.S.C. § 372(c).
16 For a comprehensive review of the 1980 Act, including its contents and history,
see Burbank, ProceduralRulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REv 283 (1982) (on the discipline

provisions); Remington, Circuit Council Reform: A Boat Hook for Judges and Court
Administrators, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv 695 (on the federal judicial circuit council reform).
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The purpose of this Article is to discuss the general topic of
judicial discipline. Discussion will occur under five general subject headings: (1) separation of powers and the resulting tensions;
(2) reflections about enactment of the 1980 judicial discipline
legislation; (3) an analysis of what has occurred since 1980; and
(4) an examination of several amendments that could be made
not only to the 1980 Act but also to other sections in the United
States Code. The Article concludes that the current system is
working tolerably well; that some statutory changes to the 1980
Act are needed and that a study commission on judicial impeachment and removal is appropriate, but that constitutional amendments are not necessary; and that all three branches of
government need to be more vigilant in providing for the care
and well-being of the Constitution. A copy of proposed legislation is included.
I.

SEPARATION OF POWERS AND RESULTING TENSIONS

The 1980 Act17 would never have been passed if the proponents and the authors of the legislation had not been able to
navigate the rocky shoals of separation of powers. It took almost
fifty years to chart the path. The legislative delegation of power
to the judicial branch of government to discipline judges does
raise delicate constitutional questions, but do not forget that the
judiciary itself implemented much of the contemplated reform,
by rule and in reliance on a different statute, 8 prior to enactment. The judiciary had and continues to have inherent power
to establish internal operating procedures in a broad variety of
areas, including discipline.
Ours is truly a constitutional system of government based
on a separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches. Montesquieu's theory that the powers of government should be strictly separated, one from the other, certainly had great meaning among our forefathers and has
continuing validity today In the modern age of the telephone
and shrinking geographic distances, however, the crystalline edges
of separation of powers may have become a bit dulled.

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
is 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1948).
17

KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL

[VOL. 76

Although the Supreme Court has made pronouncements that
ascribe great rigidity to the constitutional scheme of separation

that plainly does not exist, 19 the more considered opimons discuss
the elasticity of the concept. 20 Before ratification of the Constitution, Madison observed that the proposed scheme sought a

"balance of powers and interests."

21

Responding to criticism

about the blending of powers, he explained that Montesquieu

"did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other."

22

We know that instead of concentrating power in a single
institution, the founding fathers chose to disperse authority among
three independent and autonomous branches of government,

empowering the leaders of each branch with the "necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.' '23
As befits this system of separated and interdependent powers
with checks and balances, there is a counterweight to the congressional authority to oversee and to legislate for the federal
judiciary The framers promoted the autonomy of the judicial
branch by providing lifetime tenure for judges,2 erecting a bar

against the diminution of salary while in office,2 and equipping
the federal judiciary with the power to review congressional

enactments. 26 In turn, the framers provided another counterweight to the lifetime tenure clause by providing that federal
judges could be impeached and removed from office. 27 The

19Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1881) ("[T]he perfection of the
system requires that the lines which separate and divide these departments shall be
broadly and clearly defined.").
20 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116-27 (1926).
21 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937)
at 77.
2
THE FEDERALisT Nos. 47-48, at 337-38 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961)
(emphasis in onginal).
2
Id. at No. 51, at 356 (J. Madison).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges
shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour.
").
25

Id.

Id. at § 2, cI. 1.
Id. at art. II,§ 4 ("[A]II civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
21
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founding fathers did not guarantee the independence of officeholders in such an absolute way as to threaten the orderly
functioning of the officeholder's branch of government. The
whole purpose of the Constitution was to avoid despotism. As
has been constantly recognized during this nation's history, the
independence, autonomy, and integrity of a branch of government must take precedence over the independence of an individual officeholder. 28
This blending of powers and principles provides our country
with institutionalized tension between and within the branches
of government and places it at the very heart of American polity
The level of tension, like a child's temperature, need only concern us when it is too high or too low
During the past year, as we celebrated the two hundredth
anniversary of the United States Constitution, our focus has
been not so much on changing the Constitution but on finding
ways to improve its workings for the next century We have
studied the evolving nature of our charter and have not ignored
its weaknesses. As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted, we see
"that the true miracle was not the birth of the Constitution but
its life, a life nurtured through two turbulent centuries of our
own making, and a life embodying much good fortune that was
not." 29
One of the critical weaknesses between the branches is their
inability to communicate effectively with each other. In the most
recent Federalist Paper, Publius (a/k/a Judge Frank Coffin)
observes: "The Judiciary and the Congress not only do not
communicate with each other on their most basic concerns; they
do not know how they may properly do so." ' 30 Lack of understanding among the three coordinate branches is a "chronic,
debilitating fever" 31 that affects the entire body politic. Admittedly, the weakest branch, the judiciary, needs protection; but

28 See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs, 433 U.S. 425, 441 (1977);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501
(1972).
"Remarks of Thurgood Marshall, San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law
Association Annual Seminar (May 6, 1987).
30 Coffin, The FederalistNo. LXXXVI on Relations Between the Judiciary and
Congress, BROoKinos Rav., Winter-Spring 1986, at 27.
31Id.
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it also needs accountability and ethics. Judicial independence
and accountability are like oil and vinegar; they mix with shaking, and the result is better than either part alone.
In discussing the subject of judicial discipline and impeachment, we witness first-hand institutionalized tension, a tension
that, when properly harnessed, can be constructive. An understanding of this tension leads us to the inescapable conclusion
that any statutory solution to the "discipline" problem must
involve all three branches of government. The only alternative
is by way of constitutional amendment and a reallocation of
respective powers between the branches. At present, this alternative, fraught with risks, is not necessary
II.

REFLECTIONS ON TME JUDIcIAL

DIscIPLNE ACT OF 1980

An analysis of the 1980 Act 32 reminds us of three basic facts:
the Act was the product of consensus and comprormse; a serious
effort was made to ensure the Act's constitutionality; and the
Act was passed with the understanding that congressional oversight would be vigilant.
In 1980, Congress was importuned to "measure the need for
the legislation and then to craft a logical, economical and fair
solution to the problem. ' 33 In response, a policy objective was
identified: "[To improve judicial accountability and ethics, to
promote respect for the principle that the appearance of justice
is an integral element of this country's system of justice, and,
at the same time, to maintain the independence and autonomy
of the judicial branch of government. 3 4 With the cooperation
of the three branches of government, 35 a compromise-consensus
piece of legislation was developed to meet these policy needs. In
this regard, a reading of the House and Senate hearings held on
judicial discipline legislation reveals the fingerprints of each of
36
the three branches.

31
3

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
126 CONG. REc. H8785 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kasten-

meier).
'4

Id. at S13,858 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).

31 The three branches of government worked together at the highest level. Chief

Justice Burger was personally involved as was Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti.
36 See 1979-80 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 53-106 (statements of Judges
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The judicial branch itself was especially active. Since 1940,
the Judicial Conference and its subcommittees have devoted

enormous time and energy to this difficult subject. In 1979, after
a full year of sustained study, the Conference concluded that

judicial discipline legislation could be supported if it respected
several principles.17 To achieve this end, the Conference prepared

a draft bill. The bill was refined by staff and ultimately intro-

duced in the House.38 Even before final enactment of a public

law, a majority of the circuits' judicial councils implemented the
resolution of the Judicial Conference, creating their own complaint mechamsms.3 9
The drafters took utmost care to ensure the bill's constitutionality The admomtion that conscientious legislators have an
independent obligation to identify and resolve constitutional

Browning, Wallace, and Hunter (for the judiciary)); id. at 159-83 (statement of Assistant
Attorney General Rosenberg (for the executive)); id. at 126-45 (statements of Chairman
Rodino and Ranking Minonty Member McClory (legislative perspectives)).
37 Id. at 57. The pnnciples were stated as follows:
(a) Removal of an Article III judge from office by any method other
than impeachment as provided in Article I of the Constitution would raise
grave constitutional questions which should be avoided.
(b) The primary responsibility for dealing with a complaint against a
United States judge should rest initially with the chief judge of the circuit
as presiding judge of the Judicial Council, who may dismiss the complaint
if it is frivolous or relates to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling,
or may close the complaint after assuring himself that appropriate corrective action has been taken.
(c) Any complaint not dismissed or closed by the presiding judge
should be referred to a committee appointed by the presiding judge,
consisting of an equal number of circuit and district judges and the presiding judge.
(d) The joint committee should report its findings and recommendations to the Judicial Council, which should take such action as is appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious admistration of the business
of the courts within the circuit.
(e) The Judicial Council may, in its discretion, refer a complaint and
the Council's recommended action to the Judicial Conference of the United
States.
(f) If the Judicial Council concludes that grounds for impeachment
may exist, it should transmit the record upon which its conclusion is based
to the Judicial Conference of the United States; the Judicial Conference
shall then deternune whether, in all the circumstances, the matter should
be referred to the House of Representatives.
39 See H.R. 6330, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
11See 1979-80 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 57, 67, 70-72.
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questions 4 was taken seriously The House Committee on the
Judiciary reviewed its own documents on the constitutional
grounds for impeachment that the Nixon impeachment inquiry
staff prepared, received extensive testimony on the issue, and
requested and reviewed a study that the Atnencan Law Division
of the Library of Congress prepared addressing the constitutional
questions. 4' The House Report 42 has a special section on constitutionality The Senate requested its own constitutional analysis
of the proposed legislation. 43 Then, the issue was debated at
some length on the Senate floor.M
From -a policy perspective, while the judicial discipline legislation was being drafted, several Members of Congress were
doubtful about whether the Act would work. Promises that
vigilant congressional oversight would occur were heard during
floor debate in both Houses. Senator DeConcini called for the
exercise of a "vigorous oversight responsibility, ' 45 and Representative Butler impressed on his colleagues the "'importance of
conducting congressional oversight in this most sensitive area."46
To facilitate this congressional oversight, the Act contains a

40 Brest, The ConscientiousLegislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation,27
STAN. L. REv 585, 587 (1975).

4, AMERICAN LAW DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
RAISED BY THE PROPOSED JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DisABIIT ACT OF 1979 (J. Killian

1979), reprintedin 1979-80 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 697-730.
42 H.R. REP. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
41 Johnny H. Killian, a highly respected specialist in American public law and the
author of the House analysis, prepared the constitutional analysis, which is reprinted in
125 CONG. REc. S15,380 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1979).
" Id. at S15,389 (statement of Sen. Mathias); id. at S15,393 (statement of Sen.
Heflin); id. at S15,412 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
During the Senate debate, the following interchange occurred:
Senator Heflin: "[W]hen an issue of constitutionality comes before
the Congress, which affects the judiciary, should there not be a higher
standard of care
on the part of Congress in looking at the constitutionality of proposed legislation when we realize that if it affects the branch
that would have to consider and determine whether or not it is constitutional? It would seem to me to place a higher degree of care on Congress
Senator Mathias: "The Senator is correct. There is a much higher
standard of care required here."
Id. at S15,391.
4, 126 CONG. REc. S13,858 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980).
Id. at H8788 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980).
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statistical report provision requiring the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts to include in his annual
report a stimmary of judicial discipline and disability complaints. "7 In addition to the need for oversight, it was observed
that "there should be a continmung dialog between the legislative

and judicial branches.
III.

"4

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE ENACTMENT OF THE

1980 ACT

Much has transpired since President Carter signed Public
Law 96-458 on October 15, 1980.49 Seven years of experience
under the Act can be distilled to the following observations and
propositions: (1) the judiciary was generously allowed a one-year
grace period to prepare for implementation of the Act (which
became effective on October 1, 1981); (2) since 1981 more than
a thousand complaints have been processed, and the Judicial
Conference has recommended implementation of illustrative rules;
(3) challenged on constitutional grounds, to date the Act has
withstood judicial scrutiny; (4) the Act has not disrupted the
autonomy of the judicial branch; and (5) the promised congressional oversight has occurred but has been somewhat sporadic.
The judicial discipline mechanism does not exist in a vacuum,
and, therefore, several outside factors have affected it during its
short lifespan. Since 1980, the United States Department of
Justice has prosecuted three federal judges, convicting two of
felony offenses. In 1986, the House Committee on the Judiciary
created an important precedent for impeachment, deciding that
a judge cannot be impeached for the act of judicial decisionmaking. Finally, as the size of the federal judiciary has continued
to grow, the problems of ethics and discipline have increased
proportionally Each of these items deserves separate discussion;
Implementation. Despite the fact that most of the circuit
councils had promulgated discipline rules prior to enactment of
the 1980 Act, Congress manifested its respect for the judicial

47 Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 5, 94 Stat. 2035, 2040-41 (1980) (codified as 28 U.S.C.
§ 604(h)(2)(1980)).
4 126 CONG. REC. H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
1,The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 332, 372 (1980)).
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branch by allowing an inordinately long transition period. Signed
by President Jimmy Carter on October 15, 1980, the Act became
effective on October 1, 1981.5 0 In the context of legislation
affecting the structure of the judicial or executive branches, a
one-year delayed effective date is an inordinately long period of
time to allow for implementation, especially when the governmental entity has promoted the legislation in advance. At the
very least, the long transition period is another palpable sign of
congressional respect for the autonomy and independence of the
judiciary When the Act finally became effective on October 1,
1981, eleven circuit councils had promulgated revised rules to
implement the Act; the recalcitrant Tenth Circuit continued to
rely on rules that were first issued in 1978.
The initial set of post-Act rules was criticized as not meeting
5
the purposes and goals that Congress clearly contemplated. '
Among the criticisms were the following: the rules did little more
than track the provisions of the Act; the rules were not uniform
on a number of subjects requiring uniform treatment; some rules
conflicted with the Act's specific procedural guidelines; and rulemaking and reporting under the Act were not faithful to the
Act's goal of public accountability 52 Finally, it was recommended that the Judicial Conference use its powers to fashion
model rules to serve congressional dictates more effectively 51
Illustrative Rules. Recently, the Judicial Conference recommended that model rules, developed by a special committee of
the Conference of Chief Judges of the Umted States Courts of
Appeals, be substantially adopted by the circuit councils on an
experimental basis. 54 The model rules provide answers to many
unresolved procedural questions. Already accepted in major part
by all but one of the circuit councils, these rules will serve to
create uniformity and reduce internal tensions witun the federal
judiciary caused by the clash between localism (the regional
circuit councils) and centralization (the Judicial Conference).

50
SI
32

Id. at § 7.
See Burbank, supra note 16, at 289.
Id. at 290.

11Id. at 290-91.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,

ILLUSTRATrvE RuLEs GOVERNING

COMPLAINTS

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DIsABIITY, viii (1986) [hereinafter ILLUsTRATIvE RULES].

OF
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One respected commentator has aptly observed that both the
process of formulating the rules and the final work-product
"represent major advances in the federal judiciary's effort to
engage in responsible self-regulation that adequately respects the
legitimate interests of Congress and the public." 55 The judicial
branch deserves much credit for its illustrative rulemaking endeavor.
Constitutionality Every court that has adjudicated cases
challenging the Act has found that it passes constitutional muster. 56 Several lawsuits have attacked the Act as an impermissible
method of circumventing the only constitutional mechanism for
disciplining federal judges: impeachment. The Supreme Court
has not made a definitive statement, but several courts have
upheld the Act's constitutionality In 1986, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the statute, far from being an unconstitutional encroachment on the autonomy of the federal judiciary, strengthened the independence of the judicial branch as a whole.5 7 Finding
that the judiciary has a direct interest in keeping its own house
in order, the Eleventh Circuit observed that "a credible internal
complaint procedure can be viewed as essential to maintaining
the institutional independence of the courts." 58 In 1984, the
District Court for the District of Columbia rejected a frontal
attack on the Act's constitutionality, finding that it represented
a legitimate exercise of Congress' "necessary and proper" authority"
By redefimng the composition of the Judicial Councils and
enhancing and perfecting their inherent authority, Congress
was in no respect intruding upon judicial independence. Rather,
it was simply recognizing the need to give the courts reasonable
59
means to put the judiciary's own house in order.

11Burbank,
Act, 71

Politics and Progress in Implementing the FederalJudicialDiscipline

JuDicAwTEE

13, 16 (1987).

16In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1502-15 (1lth
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3273 (1986); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the
United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272
(1986); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 593 F Supp. 1371, 137984 (D.D.C. 1984) (upholding constitutionality), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986).
'7 In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d at 1507.
5"Id.
11Hastings, 593 F Supp. at 1380.
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Perhaps, in the near future, the Supreme Court will consider a
constitutional challenge to the statute and lay to rest all doubts
about any infirmities.
Judicial autonomy From a policy perspective, the 1980 Act
certainly has neither disrupted the autonomy of the judicial
branch nor affected its ability to function. The original costestimate of the Congressional Budget Office on the Act, prepared in reliance on data provided by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, stated that the federal judicial
branch would need fifteen additional staff positions to "process
2,300 complaints per year."' 0 From October of 1981-when the
Act became effective-until June 30, 1987, 1153 complaints were
filed. 61 As was expected, the chief judges dismissed most of these
complaints. During 1986-87 there were 232 complaints filed
against judicial officers, a decrease of approximately twenty-six
percent from the previous reporting year, when 312 complaints
were filed. 62 The 1987 statistics show that the allegation most
often cited in complaints was that the officer had acted in a
prejudicial or biased manner 63 and that most complaints were
resolved by the chief judges. 64 To date, the judicial branch has
not requested augmented staffing to meet the demands of the
Act. If a budgetary need arises, Congress would most likely
favorably treat a request for more resources.
By way of comparison, the House Committee on the Judiciary received sixty-five complaints against judicial officersmore than any single circuit. 65 Although the Committee does not
act and is not required to act on every complaint, this large
volume of complaints represents a substantial amount of work.
Disgruntled litigants, dissatisfied with judicial decision-making
and furious that their judicial discipline complaints were dismissed as being related to the merits of a decision, formulated
many of the complaints. Nonetheless, the inverse relationship
60

H.R. REP. No. 1313, supra note 42, at 21.

61

Report of Complaints Filed and Action Taken Under Title 28 U.S.C. Section

372(c), 1987 Din. AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP 56 table 26.
62 Id.

Id. at 57 table 27
, Id. at 56 table 26.
65 See House Comm. ON Tim JuDIcARY SuMMARY oF AcTvrrs, 100th Cong., 1st
6

Sess. (1987).
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between the rising number of complaints filed with the House
Committee and the decreasing number of complaints filed with
the councils warrants close scrutiny in the years ahead.
Statistics about the number of misconduct complaints filed
against judges can be somewhat misleading. Many serious judicial problems have not been processed under the complaint
mechanism but rather have informally been referred to the attention of the circuit chief judges. One knowledgeable commentator reports that "often, problems are solved without a complaint
ever being filed." 66
Oversight. The congressional oversight demanded in both the
House and the Senate has been sporadic. During the 99th Congress, the House Courts Subcommittee 67 and the Senate Constitution Subcommittee held oversight hearings. 6 Key staffers have
attended meetings held by the judicial branch. A significant
amount of correspondence between members of Congress and
representatives of the judiciary has occurred.
Other external factors have had an impact on the functioning
of the Act. Since 1980, three federal judges have been prosecuted
for having committed federal felonies: two were convicted by
juries of their peers; and the third was acquitted. In 1986, Judge
Harry Claiborne was impeached and removed from office by
the Umted States Senate for having violated three (of four)
articles of impeachment. Judge Walter Nixon has been convicted. Having exhausted all direct appeals, he presently is the
subject of an impeachment inquiry by a House Judiciary subcommittee. Although Judge Alcee Hastings was acquitted, the
Judicial Conference found that grounds for impeachment may
be warranted and transmitted this determination to the House
of Representatives. An impeachment inquiry by another House
Judiciary subcommittee is ongoing.

" Fitzpatnck, Misconduct and Disabilityof FederalJudges: The UnreportedFederal Responses, 71 JUDIcATURE 282, 283 (1988).
67 See FederalJudicialBranch: Oversight Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Courts, CivilLiberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).

6 See JudicialDiscipline: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Senate
Hearing on JudicialDiscipline].
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The lessons of the Claiborne impeachment are instructive.
The major message is that the framers crafted a process that
has proved to be efficacious, durable, and flexible: efficacious
in that impeachment works; durable in that the process withstands the test of time; and flexible in that a modern day
impeachment can be molded to meet current procedural and
institutional pressures. But, students of the Congress and of
impeachment also must recognize that the process was exceedingly difficult to implement and then to operate in a timely and
fair fashion. The Claiborne impeachment, which occurred at the
very end of a busy Congress, caused members of the House and
Senate to expend countless hours. The actual record reflects that
the Senate devoted ten days of time (in the Committee of twelve)6 9
and approximately eighteen hours of actual floor consideration. 70
According to the Senate Majority Leader, the floor proceedings
took more time than all but the most major issues that the 98th
Congress considered. 71 In other words, the message about the
Claiborne impeachment is a mixed one: the good news is that
the system works; the bad news is that it is hard work.
Under closer scrutiny, other lessons become apparent. Reliance on current constitutional provisions and parliamentary procedures in the future will make it difficult to create anything
other than a case-by-case impeachment process. "Each case of
impeachment necessarily must stand on the facts and findings
adduced by the House of Representatives with respect to the
case before it."I72 The House, in drafting articles of impeachment
against a convicted judge, may be able to take "judicial notice"
in a legislative setting of factual findings made by a unammous
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Senate, however, by rejecting the third article of impeachment (which sought to impeach Judge Claiborne based on his felony conviction and the
jury verdict), manifested an unwillingness to establish a fast" 132 CONG. REc. S15,482 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (statement of Sen. Dole); one
day was for an organizational meeting; two days for pretrial argument; and seven days
to hear testimony.
The transcript of the hearings held by the Committee totals more than 3,500 pages.
Heflin, supra note 4, at 124.
70 See 132 CoNe. REc. S15,481 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986); id. at S15,759.
" Id. at S16,788 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Dole).
72 H. REp. No. 688, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1986).
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track process. 3 Simultaneously, the Senate confirmed past precedents by determining that a felony conviction is not necessary
for impeachment. The fourth article of impeachment levelled
against Judge Claiborne, for wich he was found guilty, 74 makes
clear that the constitutional standard for impeachment exacts of
judges the highest standards of public and private rectitude. The
Code of Judicial Conduct and the oath of office serve as guides
for defining an impeachable offense. If a judge does not "discharge and perform all duties incumbent on him," the judge
may be impeached for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" as
those terms are used in the Constitution. 75
In 1986, the House Committee on the Judiciary was presented with an impeachment question of first impression. A
member of Congress delivered thousands of form petitions and
mscellaneous letters calling for the impeachment of three judges
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
for rendering a judicial opinion in the famous Alday murder
case. 76 None of the petitions alleged unethical or criminal activity; they merely requested an impeachment inquiry based on the
allegedly irresponsible granting of a new trial on the basis of
unfair pretrial publicity to three defendants previously convicted
of murder. After a review of the petitions and the facts, a
determination was made that federal judges should not be impeached for judicial decisionmaking-even if the decision is an
erroneous one. A judicial decision (standing alone) does not rise
to the level of a "high crime or misdemeanor." If this were
otherwise, the impeachment remedy would become merely another avenue for judicial review 77

73 The Senate rejected the "impeachment based on prior felony conviction" approach incorporated in the third article of impeachment by 46 Senators voting "guilty,"
17 Senators voting "not guilty," and 35 voting "present." The necessary two-thirds
vote therefore was not obtained. See 132 CONG. Rac. S15,761 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986).
14 The Senate voted to convict Judge Claiborne on the fourth article-a "high
misdemeanor" count-by a vote of 89 "guilty," 8 "not guilty," and 1 "present." Id.
at S15,762.
11U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 4.
76 Petitions Circulate to Impeach Judges After Alday Ruling, Atlanta Const., Jan.
3, 1986, at 15A, col. 4.
77 Findings and Conclusions of Robert W
Kastenmeier on Citizen Petitions to
Impeach Three Federal Judges (Sept. 25, 1986) [hereinafter Findings and Conclusions];
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Since enactment of the 1980 discipline Act, the federal court
system has continued to grow by leaps and bounds. 78 Today, it
is not farfetched to envision a future judiciary with more than
1,500 lifetime tenured judges, With an attrition rate of approximately ten percent, as is currently the case, the Senate would
have to confirm approximately 150 judges a year-or close to
one judge each legislative working day Having experienced three
criminal prosecutions against federal judges in the recent past,
a growing number of felony cases brought against sitting judges
can be expected as judgeships are added to the judicial system.
IV

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Seven years of operational experience under the 1980 Act
reveal that the discipline mechanism basically sails smoothly, but
to increase both effectiveness and efficiency, its jibs need tightening. Congress should seriously consider twelve changes. The
proposed amendments, even considered collectively, will not
amount to a total redesign of the Act. Eight of the proposed
changes are refinements or clarifications of current statutory
text. Four further amendments would be made to other sections
of the United States Code, the first granting contempt power in
discipline cases to circuit councils, the second amending the oath
of office for federal judges, the third modifying the Ethics in
Government Act, 79 and the fourth increasing the authority of
the circuit advisory commttees of the circuit to assist in drafting
discipline rules. Finally, Congress should create a national commission on judicial impeachment.

Ouster of Judgesfor Rulings Denied, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1986, at 31, col. 1. Chairman
Peter W Rodino, Jr., concurred with this determination. Letter from Honorable Peter
W Rodino, Jr., to Honorable Charles Hatcher (Oct. 14, 1986).
11In 1984, Congress created 79 new federal judgeships, makang a total of 752
lifetime tenured judges (counting the United States Supreme Court). Of the new judges,
55 were for the district courts for a total of 575 district judgeships, and 24 were circuit
judgeships for a total of 168. See Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 346, 348 (1984) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1984) (circuit judgeships) & 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1984) (distnct judgeships)).
1' Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified
in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 28, and 39 of U.S.C.).
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Amendments to the JudicialDiscipline Act

The proposed amendments 0 to the 1980 Act fall into the
following eight subject headings: (1) identifications of complaints
by circuit chief judges; (2) membership of the special investigative committees; (3) public availability of discipline recommendations; (4) impeachment referrals with respect to convicted
judges; (5) rules by the Judicial Conference and the circuit
councils; (6) dismissal of complants; (7) reimbursement of reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees; and (8) several techmcal amendments.
1. Identification of Complaints by Circuit Chief Judges
The 1980 Act, by creating a discipline mechanism based on
the filing of complaints with the circuit council, accomplished
the dual objective of both augmenting the powers of the circuit
councils and increasing the authority of the circuit chief judges.
Under the statute, any person (including a judge, attorney, member of Congress, prosecutor, or journalist) can file a complaint.
Two questions have arisen about the written complaint requirement: first, what are the residual powers of the chief judge and
the council absent the filing of a complaint? And second, can a
newspaper editorial or letter be considered as a complaint?81 A
policy split among the circuits exists on the latter question.12
These questions boiled to the surface during the Claiborne
impeachment. After Judge Claiborne had been convicted and all
his direct appeals had been exhausted, and indeed after he had
commenced serving his prison sentence, not a single written
complaint was filed with the circuit against him. It was the initial
position of the Ninth Circuit that nothing could be done. 83

10
The amendments are incorporated in H.R. 4393,
'

100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).

See Burbank, supra note 16, at 332 & n.203 (1982).

82The ILusARnE RuLEs, supra note 54, accurately reflect that the availability
of a complaint procedure does not preclude the chief judge from considering any

information that might be brought to the judge's attention. See id. at Rule 20.
" As Ninth Circuit Judge Charles E. Wiggins observed, "there was general perception that the act was triggered by a citizen complaint." See Conduct of Harry E.
Claiborne, U.S. District Judge, District of Nevada: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm, on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1986) [hereinafter House Hearings on Judge Clat-
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Aware through numerous news reports that a federal judge had
started serving a prison sentence, interested citizens could not
understand this bureaucratic inertia. Ultimately, public confidence in the discipline process plummeted.
In response, the first amendment to the 1980 Act-paragraph
(1) of section 372(c)-would clarify that in the interests of the
effective and expeditious business of the courts and based on
information available to the chief judge of the circuit, the chief
judge may identify a complaint for purposes of judicial discipline, thereby dispensing with the requirement of filing a written
complaint. In exercising this discretion, the chief judge must
enter a written order explaiting the reasons for waiving the
84
written complaint requirement.
The structure of the 1980 Act would not be deleteriously
affected by this modest increase in the authority of the chief
judges of the circuits. On the contrary, this clarification merely
reinforces the historic functions of the chief judge to respond to
problems that come to his or her attention, a function that
existed prior to the Act.8 5
2.

Membership of Special Investigative Committees

A second change to the 1980 Act would provide statutory
clarification regarding the membership of judges who serve on
special investigative committees. Under current law, if a chief
judge is unable to resolve a complaint, the judge appoints himself or herself and an equal number of circuit and district judges
of the circuit to a special committee to investigate the facts and
allegations in the complaint.8 6 The law is silent on what happens
if the membership of a special committee changes during an
investigation.
An amendment to paragraph (4) of section 372(c) would
accomplish two important objectives. First, any judge appointed

borne]. But see 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(7)(B) (1984) (In any case in which the judicial council
determines, on the basis of a complaint or other information, that a judge has engaged
in conduct that might constitute grounds for impeachment, the council shall promptly
certify such determination to the Judicial Conference of the United States.).
14

H.R. 4393, supra note 80, at § 101.

See ILLusTRATE RurEs, supra note 54, at Rule 20 comment.
16 See The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980, supra note 15, at § 3(c)(4)(A).
"
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to a special committee may continue to serve on the committee
after becoming a semor judge or, in the case of the chief judge
of the circuit, after his or her term of office expires. 87 Second,
if a judge on a special committee dies or retires from the bench
while serving on the committee, then the chief judge is authorized to appoint a replacement.8 8
Experience under the Act reveals that the resolution of most
complaints takes very little time. Nonetheless, the difficult cases,
which may raise allegations of impeachable activities and which
may result in sanctions, can take a special committee a significant amount of time, perhaps months and even years. In lengthy
inquiries, the possibility of member turnover becomes infinitely
greater. Moreover, under a recent statutory change, chief judges
of the circuits serve for terms of office not to exceed seven
years.89 It would be a gross waste of judicial resources to require
that a circuit recommence an investigation if a chief judge leaves
office, voluntarily or involuntarily By the same token, it could
be grossly unjust to a judge facing a complaint if an investigation
were accelerated to fit within a term of office.
Such council membership imbroglios have not yet occurred.
In the interest of fairness to these judges and also in deference
to judicial efficiency, statutory ambiguity in the membership
requirements of special committees should now be resolved with
the proposed amendment.
3.

Public Availability of Impeachment Recommendations

Under present law when a determination is made by the
Conference that "consideration of impeachment may be warranted,'' 90 the Conference certifies and transmits the determination to the House of Representatives for whatever action the
House considers appropriate. Normally, the Conference's order
will be accompanied by written reasons explaining the decision. 91
t H.R. 4393, supra note 80, at § 101.

s Id.
"

See Pub. L. No. 97-164 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A) (1982)) (Chief

judges of the circuits serve for seven year terms, and no chief judge may act in that
capacity after attaining the age of seventy.).

28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(8) (1984).
91Id.
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The Conference, relying on its broad discretbii, will make its
written ordei and the reasons for the ordei available to the
public thrbugh the appropriate clerk's office. 92 Nevertheless, all
papers, documents, ahd records of the, proceedings referred to
th Ho'use of Representatives are confidential. 9
It makes little sense, especially to members of the press corps
and to the public, that the Conference's determinations of possible grounds for impeachment are publicl, available at the
Supreme Court yet are confidential iii the office of the House
Clerk. Admittedly, inqiring parties can be instructed to walk
across Capitol Hill to the Supreme Cou'rit Clerk's Office. However, a better re'course is a permanent fix in the statute books,
specifying that upon receipt of a Conference determination and
the record of proceedings, the Clerk of the House shall make
the written order and any reasons for the-order available to the
public. Under the proposed modification, background materials,
including a record of the proceedings and documents related to
the investigation, will remain confidential unless the appropriate
council, the Conference or the House or Senate (by resolutn)
release any materials that are believed necessary to an impeach94
mert proceeding.
.Further, in serious cases that might result in tle imposition
of a sanction on a judge, a circuit council should be granted
discretion to release a copy of the report. of a special investigative
committee to both the complainant whose complaint ignited the
discipline mechanism and the judge whose conduct is implicated. 95 Under current law, the confidentiality rule is so ironclad
that disclosure of information to the complainant, complained
about judge, or the public is probably foreclosed. A good case
can be made for disclosing information to the complainant or
judge that may be relevant to an impending order to sanction.
Such information, especially if it relates to a potential prosecution for criminal activity or perjury, would also ultimately be of
great interest to law enforcement officials. 96

92

Id.

9 Id. at § 372(c)(14).
94 Id.

" See Burbank, supra note 55, at 20.

9 The circuit judges who prepared the Illustrative Rules were similarly bothered
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4. Impeachment Recommndatlofis with Respect to Convicted
Judges
If a judge has been convicted of a felonyr '.iid ill direct
appeals have been exhausted without sutcess; the Judicial Conference should be statutorily authorized to transmit a declaration
directly to the Congress (bypassing the need for circuit council
action), stating that "iinpeachment may be warranted."
Currently, the Judicial Conference lacks authority to act on
any matter not referred by a circuit council. 97 In the case. of a
judge convicted of a feloijy who has unsuccessfully exhausted
all direct appe~s, to require the Conference to wait for a codncil
certification that impeachable activity may have occurred is of
questionable merit. One does not have to be a judge or legislator
to identify a better course. An amendment charts this course by
authorizing the Conference, by majority vote and without council action, to transmit to the House of Representatives a determination and appropriate court records indicating that
consideration of impeachment may be warranted for whatever
action the House considers necessary This amendment would
not strip the circuit councils of their own authority; ideally,
there would still be a council action upon which the Conference
could base its own. determination. But, if a council balks at
acting, the matter would proceed expeditiously through the judicial branch to the Congress for appropriate action.
The proposed amendment to paragraph (8) of section 372(c)
would simply authorize the Conference to exercise its discretion
by majority vote and without a referral or certification from a
circuit council. The Conference would transmit to the House of
Representatives a determination that consideration of impeachment may be warranted, and the House could take whatever
action it deems necessary.
5. Rules by the Judicial Conference and the Circuit Judicial
Councils

Paragraph (11) of section 372(c) currently confers rulemaking
authority on each judicial council and the Judicial Conference
by the lack of flexibility in the confidentiality rule. See
54, at Rule 16 comment.

28 U.S.C. at § 372(c)(8).

ILIuSTRATvE

RUtLs, supra note
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of the United States.9 8 The statutory text, in addition to mandating rules that contain provisions for notice and the right to
appear at a proceeding, requires that rules be made public and
that the Conference can modify any council rule. 99
Two amendments would fortify this statutory framework.
The first would clarify that any new rules or amendments to
rules by the councils or the Conference would occur only after
appropriate notice is made to the public and opportumty is given
for comment. The first would ensure a modicum of public
participation in the rulemaking process. Presumably, the public
comments received after notice would contribute to a better
work-product. The second amendment would circumscribe the
rule-making power of the circuit councils so that a council could
not create a statute of limitations. As to the latter, the rulemaking authorization of the 1980 Act extends to "rules for the
including the processing of petitions
conduct of proceedings
for review
-10o This procedural grant that Congress confers
on courts or agencies ordinarily would not allow the making of
rules of substantive content. A statute of limitations does have
a procedural aspect, but it is so intertwined with substance that
rulemaking entities should not merge the two.' 0° Because the
1980 Act was ambiguous about whether circuit rules could provide for a statute of limitations, the text should be clarified on
this point: statutes of limitations are for the Congress to make
and not for the rulemakers. In appropriate cases, complaints
can be dismissed for unreasonable delay in filing, by analogy to
the equitable doctrine of laches.
6.

Dismissal of Complaints

The 1980 Act includes a comprehensive laundry list of circuit
council powers relating to the disposition of discipline complaints. 1° Among the enumerated powers are the ability to conduct an additional investigation, certify disability, order a

- Id. at § 372(c)(11).
99 Id.

See id.
1*1See Burbank, supra note 16, at 338-39.
I- See 28 U.S.C. at § 372(c)(6).
10
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voluntary retirement, temporarily remove cases, and censure or
reprimand either by private communication or by public announcement. A search for explicit statutory authority to dismiss,
however, is doomed to fail. Because the entire statutory scheme
turns on the ability to dismiss, lack of clarity on this point
ordinarily would not be significant. The power clearly exists.
A drafting improvement to the Act could be made by adding
a provision in a new section 372(c)(6)(C) stating that the councils
have dismissal authority Because the Act elsewhere requires that
the judicial branch keep statistics on the general nature and
disposition of all complaints, 10 3 a specific reference to dismissal
on the list of council powers would contribute to statistical
consistency among the circuits and also would further understanding of the Act.104
7

Reimbursement of Reasonable Expenses, Including
Attorneys' Fees

The Act should state clearly whether a judge, particularly
one who is not sanctioned and indeed is vindicated by the
proceedings, can receive recompense for expenses, including attorneys' fees in defending against a complaint. The text of the
1980 Act was silent on this issue, and the legislative history is
sparse. Support for the power to pay attorneys' fees is derived
from a statement of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to
the House Committee on the Judiciary 105 The Administrative
Office of the United States Courts provided the information for
the CBO cost-estimate, so the assumption that the Act authorizes
the payment of attorneys' fees emanates from the judicial branch
of government, and not from the Congress.
In any event, an ambiguity exists that needs clarification. A
proposed amendment creating a new section (16) of section
372(c) of the United States Code would confer authority on the
circuit councils to recommend to the Director of the Adminis-

103Id. at § 604(h)(2).
104As a drafting proposition, the power to dismiss could be placed in § 372(c)(6)(B),
but then all dismissal orders would become public under § 372(c)(15). That publicity is
not necessary.
M See H.R. REP. No. 1313, supra note 42, at 21-22.
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trative Office of the United States Courts that reimbursement
of reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, be awarded to
a judge for those expenses that would not have otherwise been
incurred but for the investigation. Reasonable expenses may be
awarded, however, only when a complaint is finally dismissed.
The proposed amendment would implicitly confer similar authority on the Judicial Conference, which could order the awarding of reasonable expenses through the appropriate council.
During the legislative process, Congress may well want to consider broadening the amendment to allow the award of attorneys'
fees in circumstances other than dislmssals.
8.

Several Technical Amendments

A recent circuit court decision contained extensive discussion
of the importance of the phrase "impeachment may be warranted," which permits a certification by the Judicial Conference
to the House of Representatives. ° 6 The court postulated that
"weighty constitutional issues would arise if certification by the
Conference to the House were mandatory '3t 7 and reaffirmed,
from a plain reading of the statute, that any certification by
both the councils and the Conference is entirely discretionary 101
Under the 1980 Act, neither the circuit councils nor the Judicial
Conference is required to determine whether a judge may have
committed an impeachable offense. The same language should
be used when referring to the powers of the circuit councils and
the Conference because of the need to promote drafting consistency. A technical amendment to the statutory text could easily
accomplish this objective.
Under present law, the circuit council has the power to refer
a matter, either based on a complaint together with the record
of associated proceedings or on the basis of information otherwise available, to the Judicial Conference if the judge has engaged in conduct that "might constitute one or more grounds
for impeachment under article I of the Constitution.
,,)09 The
106Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986).
107Id. at 1100.

108Id.

10928 U.S.C. at § 372(c)(7)(B)(i).
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statutory reference to article I is technically correct insofar as
congressional authority to impeach resides therein. The grounds
for impeachment are, however, located in article II of the
Constitution1 ° and therefore the reference is defective."' The
Act should be amended by striking the reference to article I and
referring to article II of the Constitution.
B. Amendments to Other Sections of Title 28, United States
Code
The following four provisions, found elsewhere in the Judicial Code, should also be amended.
1.

Contempt Power

The circuit councils should be granted power to institute
contempt proceedings to enforce orders not obeyed by court
officers or employees. The granting of authority to the circuit
councils to pursue contempt citations, specifically in discipline
cases, would be a logical and a natural outgrowth of the 1980
Act.
In 1980, the councils' powers were substantially augmented
by a general grant of authority to "make all necessary and
appropriate orders for the effective administration of justice
within [the] circuit."" 2 This overall responsibility was bolstered
by a specific delegation of authority to hold hearings, take sworn
testimony, and issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum.
Additionally, all judicial officers and employees of the circuit
and district courts in the circuit were required to obey all council
3
orders."
Prior to 1980, several federal judges had indicated to Congress that lack of subpoena authority had created difficulties in

11U.S.

CoNsT. art. II, § 4, provides: "The President, Vice President and all civil

Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
- This drafting error was first pointed out to the Committee by Charles E.
Wiggins, a former Member of the Committee and present federal judge. See House
Hearingson Judge Claiborne, supra note 83, at 36 n.i.
112 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (1980)).
HI See Rermngton, supra note 16, at 724-27.
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obtaining necessary information.1 4 By conferring subpoena authority on the councils, and by requiring all court employees to
obey council orders, it was widely perceived that, given the
proper circumstances, the information gathering abilities of the
councils would be adequate. With the passage of time, there
have been few problems in this regard.
Nevertheless, a small loophole, involving court employees
who refuse to obey subpoenas or council orders, still remains.
The gap could be filled by adding contempt power to the list of
statutory powers delegated to the circuit councils. Limited in
scope, the proposed amendment would specify that, in the instance of a failure to comply with a council order, the appropriate council or special committee of the council may institute
a contempt proceeding in any district court to show cause as to
why the judicial officer, or court employee, who fails to obey
the order should not be held in contempt.
2.

Oath of Office

The statutory oath of office for federal judges" 5 should be
amended to eliminate a phrase that qualifies their duties. Originally established by the Judiciary Act of 1789, and reenacted
several times since then, the language of the statutory oath has
remained largely unchanged over time.11 6
The phraseology and substance of the statutory oath have
been the subject of debate during several impeachment proceed-

114 Hearings on JudicialFitness Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1965)
(statement of John Biggs, Jr.); JudicialDiscipline and Tenure: Hearings on S. 295, S.
522, and S. 678 Before the Subcommittees on JudicialMachinery and Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-17 (1979) (statement of
J. Edward Lumbard).
Is 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1948). Federal judges are also required to take an oath
mandated by the Constitution of the United States. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
116The oath is as follows:
I, A.B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the nch, and
that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties
incumbent upon me as
- , according to the best of my abilities and
understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States.
So help me God.
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ings. In 1804, during the Senate trial of Samuel Chase, the

Chairman of the House Managers argued that Chase's conduct
was a violation of his oath of office, which required im to
"dispense justice faithfully and impartially, and without respect
to persons.' ' 1 17 Chase was acquitted. Some commentators have
argued that his acquittal stood for the proposition that a violation of the oath of office, unless willful, could not amount to
a high crime or misdemeanor." 8 In the successful impeachment
and removal from office of Judge West H. Humphreys, the
Senate voted on the ground, among others, that he had violated
his oath of office by failing to faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on him. 119
Debate about the scope and meamng of the oath again
surfaced during the recent Claiborne impeachment. As drafted,
the fourth article of impeachment initiated against Judge Claiborne alleged, in part, that by willfully falsifying his federal
income tax forms he violated his oath of office and reduced
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the federal judiciary The fourth article charged Judge Claiborne with violation
of a "misdemeanor" and not a "high crime." In the House
subcommittee, several Representatives expressed concern about
making reference to the oath of office at all. Congressman Mike
DeWine observed: "when you look at the oath of office, I think
it may create some evidentiary problems."' 20 Congressman Barney Frank inquired: "I was wondering if we might be setting a
precedent for people who don't do equal justice to the rich and
the poor.' '121 An attempt to delete the reference to the oath
failed narrowly by a seven-to-seven vote.'2 From that point on,

"1 I. BRANT,

(1972). But see R.
249-51 (1973).

IMPEACHMENT - TRtALs AND ERRORS 81

IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

BERGER,

1sBRANT, supra note 117, at 83.
I.
Extracts from the Journal of the United States Senate in all Cases of Impeachment Presented by the House of Representatives: 1798-1908, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 15354 (1912).
M MARxUP OF H. RES. 461, IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE HARRY E. CLAIBORNE, SUB"'

comm. OF COURTS, CIvIL LmERTIES AND THE ADMNISTRATION

COMm. ON TIE JUDICIARY, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1986).
121Id.

-

at 28.
Id. at 31.
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very little debate occurred concerning the oath, and ultimately
Judge Claiborne was convicted on the fourth count. 123
Nonetheless, the issue remains. It may be commonly accepted
that violation of an oath of office can be used to impeach a
federal judge. But that proposition does not signify that the oath
packs a powerful bite or that it is as artfully drafted, in light of
present circumstances, as it might be. At the very least, the
qualifying phrase "to the best of my abilities and understanding" should be deleted. A judge who violates the oath should
certainly not have a defense of weakness, of ability, or of mind.
Admittedly, amending any aspect of the historic Judiciary
Act of 1789 should be done only after reflection and study By
proposing to amend the Act at all, such analysis should follow
as a matter of inevitable course. By the same token, it is entirely
possible that, after congressional study, the proposal to only
delete eight words will be deemed inadequate. Tis proposal
might be met with efforts to add language to the oath requiring
judges to obey the laws of the United States and the canons of
judicial ethics, although the latter are not congressionally created.
3. Ethics in Government Act
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978124 should be amended
to further coordination between the executive branch, which has
statutory authority to enforce the law, and the judicial branch,
which of course adnimisters the judicial discipline mechamsm.
All federal judges are required, under the Act, to file personal
financial reports containing a full statement of assets, income,
and liabilities (for themselves as well as spouses and dependent
children). The Act additionally mandates that the Judicial Conference establish a Judicial Ethics Committee responsible for
adrmstering the legislative scheme. With the approval of the
Conference, the Committee can submit recommendations for
legislative change directly to the Congress.

'23 See

supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.

,14Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18,
28, and 39 of U.S.C.).
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Currently, the Judicial Ethics Committee will refer the name
of any judge who has willfully failed to file a financial disclosure
report or has willfully falsified a report to the Attorney General
for potential prosecution. The Committee is not required to
notify the appropriate circuit council nor the chief judge of the
circuit. Under the Ethics Act, referral to the law enforcement
branch is certainly warranted as is a notification to the judicial
branch. At the very least, the need for collegiality in the judiciary
dictates that a Conference Committee keep the regional adrmnistrative entity, the judicial council of the circuit and its chief
judge, apprised of serious ethical breaches by circuit judges. At
the most, perhaps certain ethical problems could be resolved
admimstratively, thereby avoiding the need for a prosecution. A
proposed amendment to the Ethics in Government Act would
require that whenever the Attorney General is referred a serious
ethical problem involving a federal judge, the circuit council of
the circuit where the judge resides should also be notified.
4. Advisory Committees
Several years ago the Congress created the Advisory Committees of the Circuits and charged them with the responsibility
to study the rules of practice and internal operating procedures
for the courts of appeals, and further, to make recommendations
concermng such rules and procedures. 125 The advisory committees have been successful, in large part because the circuit courts
have appointed highly qualified lawyers to those committees. It
would be an efficient use of their expertise and experience in
other rule-making areas to enlarge the powers of the committees
to participate in the drafting of discipline rules. An amendment
therefore is proposed, augmenting the role of the advisory committees of the circuits to assist m the drafting of judicial discipline rules.
C. Creationof a National Commission on JudicialImpeachment
The suggested changes to current law relating to judicial
discipline and ethics, considered together, proceed with caution

M See Pub. L. No. 97-164, tit. II, 96 Stat. 55 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b)
(1982)).

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[VOL. 76

through the intersection of separation of powers. None of these
changes impinges on the autonomy and independence of the
judicial branch, nor do they weaken the constitutional prerogatives of the legislative branch.
Even assuming enactment of the entire package, something
is missing. Although several amendments improve the channels
of commumcation between the judicial and legislative branches,
when a federal judge may have committed an impeachable offense, the proposal refrains from imtiating any constitutional or
institutional changes as to how Congress responds to the impeachment.
Realistically, an easy path through the constitutional thicket
does not exist. The avenues may be numerous, but each has
certain attractive features coupled with particular dangers lurking
close to the beaten track. The Constitution can be amended to
create a "fast-track" impeachment process. Through another
amendment, lifetime tenure could be abolished altogether by
judges being appointed to terms of office or possibly by being
elected and subjected to recall. Alternatively, the current judicial
discipline mechanism could be completely overhauled to permit
the removal of those judges guilty of transgressions by the
judiciary itself or through an independent commission.
Each of the proposals, however, potentially raises as many
serious policy and constitutional questions as it resolves. A wiser
and more moderate step, at this time, would be to create a
commission, as Senator Dole proposed during the 99th Congress, 26 to examine the scope of the problem of judicial discipline and impeachment and then to report to Congress on its
findings.
Because national study commissions often raise expectations
that they will provide answers, they can actually do more harm
than good if they fall to satisfy their mandate. Ordinarily, Congress should create a commission only if a compelling need for
a study and a report can be shown, 27 if existing governmental
1. See S.

2934, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
See Pub. L. No. 89-801, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (creating the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws); S. REP. No. 1862, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 4379, 4383; see also
Pub. L. No. 92-489, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (creating the Commission on Revision
327
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entities are not institutionally capable of tackling the problem, 12
and if reasonable expectations exist that the commission can
satisfy its entire statutory assignment.
These three standards can be shown to exist, compelling
creation of a National Commission on Judicial Impeachment.
First, there is a serious need for a full and fair investigation of
the total ecology of judicial discipline and impeachment. Never
having occurred before in the history of this country, such a
study is long overdue. Second, no single entity within the federal
government is equipped to conduct the study and to draft a
report, primarily because the problem to be analyzed is one
shared by the three branches of government. An entity that has
neither built-in bias nor loyalty to one of the branches must be
relied upon. Third, it can be assumed that studying judicial
appointments, discipline, and impeachment, a relatively limited
assignment, will allow the commission to focus its energies and
expertise and successfully satisfy its statutory mandate.
Let us examine that mandate. The duties of the commission
would be threefold. First, it would investigate and study the
problems and issues involved in the appointment and tenure
(including discipline and removal from office) of lifetime tenured
federal judges. Second, the commission would evaluate the merits of proposing alternatives to the current statutory and constitutional scheme, including possible amendments to the
Constitution. Third, the commission would prepare and submit
a report to the three branches of government. The results of the
commission's work incorporated in the report would reflect concrete and practical proposals that would certainly be useful to
the policy-making branch.
The commission would be composed of thirteen members:
three appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate;
of the Federal Court Appellate System); S. REP. No. 930, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 3602.
121During House floor debate on the proposal to create a commission to study
appellate court problems, the following exchange took place:
Mr. Snyder. "[M]y only query is why did not the Committee on the
Judiciary do this?"
Mr. Brooks. "I would be perfectly willing to do that except for the
fact that I have spent the last 20 years of my life in Congress, and not

practiced law in the circuit courts."
118 CONG. REc. 17,276 (1972).
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three by the speaker of the House of Representatives; three by
the chief justice of the Umted States; three by the president; and
one by the Conference of Chief Justices. It is contemplated that
there will be a bipartisan mix of private citizens, attorneys,
academics, and high-ranking representatives of the three branches.
Because the states are reservoirs of information and, to a certain
extent, laboratories of expermientation in the area of judicial
discipline, at least one commission member is likely to be experienced in state-admimstered programs. Provisions are made
to ensure the hiring of a top-flight staff and to procure experts
and consultants. The commission is authorized an adequate
budget.
As the focus of the commission's inquiry would be relatively
narrow, the final report would come due not later than one year
after the date of the first meeting. The report to be submitted
to each branch of Congress, the Chief Justice, and the President,
must contain a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions
of the commission, together with its concrete recommendations
for any justifiable legislative or admimstrative actions.
CONCLUSION
Congressional authority to legislate federal judicial discipline
legislation poses delicate separation of powers problems. The
need for a cooperative working relationship among the branches
of government is of paramount importance.
During a critical stage in the Constitutional Convention,
Benjamin Franklin-then a very old man-took the floor and
spoke of the need for consensus and compromise:
When a broad table is to be made, he explained, and the edges
of the planks do not fit, the artist takes a little from both,
and makes a good joint. In like manner here both sides must
part with some of their demands in order that they may join
in some accommodating proposition.
What we need today between the branches of government is
Franklin's "good joint."
To develop that joint, the most responsible course would be
to rely upon the solid lumber found in the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980. Moreover, a National Comrmssion on
Judicial Impeachment to study current problems and to recom-
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mend any solutions thereto, including constitutional amendments, should be created. As we enter the third century of our
system of government, we should be both cogmzant of our
problems and confident about the future. Our approach to the
subject of judicial appointments, discipline, and impeachment,
as it is to other weighty questions, should be one of continual
reassessment and reflection and not one of reaction.

